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INTRODUCTION 
In 2000, the United States Supreme Court noted that “[t]he demographic 
changes of the past century make it difficult to speak of an average American 
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family.”1 As a result of these demographic changes, “[m]any children are now 
raised in non-conventional settings.”2 These “non-conventional settings” in-
clude settings occupied by stepfamilies, single parents, extended family mem-
bers, individuals who are not genetically or biologically related to the children, 
and same-sex partnerships and marriages.3 On June 26, 2015, the Supreme 
Court ruled in Obergefell v. Hodges that the fundamental right to marry applies 
to same-sex couples.4 In doing so, the Court noted that a “basis for protecting 
the right to marry is that it safeguards children and families.”5 While children 
of same-sex couples will now benefit from the recognition of their parents’ 
marital relationships and the resulting legal protection of their parent-child rela-
tionships, these children, and other children of “non-conventional settings,” 
will continue to form relationships with individuals who are “parents” from the 
children’s perspective, but not legally. Such relationships still need protection 
and “safeguarding.”  
The legal implications of these aforementioned “non-conventional set-
tings” have been at issue in several other Supreme Court cases including: Mi-
chael H. v. Gerald D.,6 Moore v. City of East Cleveland,7 and Adoptive Couple 
v. Baby Girl.8 As a result, the law has had to adapt to recognize new founda-
tions for parentage and will likely continue to do so. 
Currently, there are at least five bases for recognizing parentage: 
1.   Biology, as evidenced by the presumption that a woman who gives 
birth to a child is that child’s parent;9 
                                                        
*  Visiting Assistant Professor, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. I would like to thank Bar-
bara Aronstein Black, Kent Greenawalt, and Solangel Maldonado for their comments on my 
paper at the 2014 Columbia Law School Careers in Law Teaching Moot Workshop, the at-
tendees and organizers of the 2013 Lavender Law Junior Scholars Forum, especially Nancy 
Polikoff and Courtney Joslin, and Cali Slair for her always helpful comments and edits. 
1  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
2  Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Op-
portunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 344 (1990). 
3  See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). In Obergefell, the Supreme 
Court held that same-sex couples were entitled to marry in all states and that “there is no 
lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in an-
other State on the ground of its same-sex character.” Id. at 2607–08. In spite of the Supreme 
Court’s holding, administrative challenges to same-sex marriage continue. See, e.g., County 
Court Clerks Rebel Against Same-Sex Marriage Ruling, CBSNEWS (July 6, 2015, 3:40 
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/county-court-house-clerks-rebel-against-same-sex-mar 
riage-ruling/ [perma.cc/X5YZ-2F2B]. 
4  135 S. Ct. at 2607. 
5  Id. at 2600. 
6  See generally Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
7  See generally Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
8  See generally Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013). 
9  See, e.g., In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 871 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (“Under the UPA 
[Uniform Parentage Act], the parent-child relationship between a child and his or her natural 
mother is established ‘by proof of her having given birth to the child.’ (Fam.Code § 7610, 
subd. (a).)”). 
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2.   Genetics, which is recognized by the Uniform Parentage Act and is 
most important in the recognition (or disproving) of paternity; 
3.   Intent, which is recognized in certain jurisdictions such as California, 
where a court will conclude—especially when assisted reproductive 
technology is at issue—that the “parties who had contracted for and in-
tended the pregnancy . . . were [the child’s] legal parents and had sup-
port obligations that flowed therefrom,” even though neither parent 
was biologically (or genetically) related to the child;10 
4.   Marriage, as evidenced by the marital presumption which purports that 
the husband is the father of a child born into the marriage; and 
5.   Functional or de facto parentage, which is based on a putative parent’s 
actions.  
These many bases for parentage, combined with the realities of reproduction, 
cohabitation, and family interaction, are the reason why children can have more 
than two parents. In many states, however, to have three instead of two parents 
is legally impossible.11 For example, statutory restrictions may require the 
demonstration of one or two legal parents’ unfitness as parents before a third 
party can be granted parental rights; these restrictions also prevent the assertion 
of de facto parenthood.12 Limiting the number of parents a child can have is no-
ticeably disadvantageous for a child with three fit, putative parents, as the child 
would be deprived of a parent-child relationship. Indeed, without the legal 
recognition of full parentage, children may be deprived of important sources of 
financial support and contact with their perceived parents, which may be trau-
matic to them.13  
This article seeks to resolve the questions of who should be recognized as a 
parent and what the criteria for legal recognition of parentage should be, in 
light of social and demographic changes. Many other articles focus solely on 
the parental rights of a group that is marginalized when it comes to legal recog-
nition of their significant roles in a child’s life, such as the rights of grandpar-
ents, lesbians, same-sex parents, or stepparents.14 Similarly, the literature that 
                                                        
10  See Melanie B. Jacobs, More Parents, More Money: Reflections on the Financial Implica-
tions of Multiple Parentage, 16 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 217, 220 (2010). 
11  See, e.g., Thomas v. Thomas, 49 P.3d 306, 309 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002). 
12  See, e.g., id. (explaining that the state statute only permits the granting of custody to a 
third party upon a showing that it is “significantly detrimental” to award custody to the 
child’s current legal parent at the time; therefore, awarding custody to a non-legal parent at 
the same time is not possible since the statute requires an “either-or-decision” and not both). 
As such, the former same-sex partner who was not recognized as a parent could not share 
legal custody with the former same-sex partner who was the child’s legal parent. Id. The 
statute referred to in Thomas can now be found in Arizona at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-
409 (2015) (“§ 25-409. Third party rights”). In Thomas, it is cited as ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 25-415 (2015). 
13  See Courtney G. Joslin, Interstate Recognition of Parentage in a Time of Disharmony: 
Same-Sex Parent Families and Beyond, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 563, 590–91 (2009). 
14  See, e.g., Shreya Atrey, Divorcing Parents, Alienating Children: Devising a Constructive 
Theory of Child Rights in Case of Divorce, 10 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 181 
(2010); Courtney G. Joslin, Leaving No (Nonmarital) Child Behind, 48 FAM. L.Q. 495, 500–
01 (2014) (discussing equitable parent statutes); Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not 
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focuses on children’s rights as related to parental recognition tends to classify 
children by certain subsets, focusing, for example, on the rights of children of 
same-sex couples.15 This article departs from the existing literature’s approach, 
instead addressing stepparent adoption, same-sex couples, grandparent visita-
tion, and assisted reproductive technology by creating a solution from the per-
spective of the “best interests of the child”—the historical leading standard in 
children’s protection—rather than from the perspective of the parents’ rights. It 
is likely that legislatures are not familiar with exactly how the best interests of 
the child standard operates in practice because it is a family law standard that 
generally arises in an adjudicatory context. This legislative unfamiliarity should 
not prevent state legislatures from including provisions in parentage statutes 
and hopefully conducting legislative inquiries into the best interests of the child 
through expert testimony and research.16  
Drawing from the best interests of the child standard, this article introduces 
a new doctrine for parental recognition, “parentage in praxi,” which requires 
(1) that a putative parent complete statutorily delineated requirements that cul-
minate in them standing “in the shoes of a parent,” and (2) that state law oper-
ate to allow a child to have more than two parents—if doing so would be in the 
best interests of the child. A parent in praxi would have the same rights and ob-
ligations as a legal parent. This article borrows Professor Susan Frelich Apple-
ton’s term of “original parent” to refer to the parents that the law currently 
identifies as legal parents (those parents who are deemed parents when the 
child is born).17 By recognizing parentage in praxi, states can protect the rela-
tionships that children have formed with putative parents who may not be cur-
rently recognized as legal parents, regardless of the parents’ legal status in any 
sphere not concerning the well-being of the child (e.g., marital status, familial 
status, or gender). 
A discussion of parental rights in the context of the best interests of the 
child is inescapable. Parents have certain enumerated rights and responsibilities 
                                                                                                                                 
Have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the 
Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201 (2009); Kyle C. Velte, Towards Constitu-
tional Recognition of the Lesbian-Parented Family, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 245, 
284 (2000–2001). 
15  See Tanya M. Washington, Once Born, Twice Orphaned: Children’s Constitutional Case 
Against Same-Sex Adoption Bans, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1003, 1017 (2013) [hereinafter Once 
Born, Twice Orphaned]; see also Tanya Washington et al., Amicus Brief in United States v. 
Windsor by Scholars for the Recognition of Children’s Constitutional Rights, 17 J. GENDER, 
RACE & JUST. 467 (2014). 
16  See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, DETERMINING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 1 
(2012), https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/best_inte 
rest.pdf [perma.cc/B3XZ-ZKCV] (“[When a court makes a] decision[] that affect[s] chil-
dren, including placement and custody determinations, safety and permanency planning, and 
proceedings for termination of parental rights . . . [the court] must weigh whether its decision 
will be in the ‘best interests’ of the child.”). 
17  See Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of Legitima-
cy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 283 (2006). 
16 NEV. L.J. 743, LEWIS - FINAL.DOCX 4/12/16  6:32 PM 
Spring 2016] BIOLOGY, GENETICS, NURTURE 747 
that are constitutionally recognized. Professor Susan Frelich Appleton noted 
that “the [U.S. Supreme] Court has ‘recognized the fundamental right of par-
ents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their chil-
dren,’ ” leading to her conclusion that “[t]he Supreme Court has reaffirmed the 
primacy of parental rights under the Due Process Clause.”18 Other scholars 
note, 
Going back to the 1920s in cases like Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, the Supreme Court has held that parents have a fundamental constitu-
tional right to raise their children without state interference. Custody orders, 
public school policies, or other state action that sharply limit the child-rearing 
role of either parent, the argument goes, substantially burden that right, trigger-
ing strict judicial scrutiny. And, under strict scrutiny, the state must show some 
“compelling interest”—such as imminent harm to the child—to justify its inter-
vention. Incantation of more amorphous interests, including the “best interests” 
of children, is insufficient.19 
Yet, the best interests of the child are frequently considered in state actions 
such as custody orders that could be viewed as limiting the role of a parent. 
Custody orders are commonplace. When there are multiple parents, they must 
share their parental rights and responsibilities, and the recognition of a second 
or third parent does not upset the constitutional balance between parental rights 
and the best interests of the child. The child has a right to maintain emotional 
bonds with multiple legally-recognized parents, and it is generally in the child’s 
best interest to do so.  
Parentage in praxi draws its origins from de facto parentage, which will be 
explained in the Introduction of this article. Part I discusses the “best interests 
of the child” standard and the role of a parent. Part II conducts an in-depth 
analysis of statutory and doctrinal de facto parentage (the doctrine upon which 
parentage in praxi is based) and other doctrines that recognize individuals’ 
functional parental roles, including the Uniform Parentage Act, in loco paren-
tis, psychological parentage, and visitation. Throughout Part II, the theory of 
parentage in praxi is expanded, and it is compared to existing legal doctrines 
for the preservation of third parties’ rights. This comparison also highlights 
some of the drawbacks of parentage in praxi and other doctrines, then builds 
upon these drawbacks. Part IV briefly explores the possibility of children actu-
ally having three genetic parents, made possible by scientific techniques pend-
ing approval in the United States and recently approved human subject trials in 
the United Kingdom. 
                                                        
18  See Susan Frelich Appleton, Leaving Home? Domicile, Family, and Gender, 47 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1453, 1488 (2014) (citing to the plurality opinion in Troxel v. Granville, 530 
U.S. 57, 66 (2000)). 
19  See David D. Meyer, The Constitutional Rights of Non-Custodial Parents, 34 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1461, 1474–75 (2006). 
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A.   Introduction to the Legal Approach Underlying Parentage in Praxi: De 
Facto Parentage 
A “functional approach” to parentage recognizes individuals who are not 
currently legal parents but undertake parental actions in a child’s life.20 There 
are a number of terms in use for individuals who occupy a significant parent-
like role in a child’s life. These terms include “de facto parents, parents by es-
toppel, psychological parents, intent-based parenthood, and in loco parentis sta-
tus”; these terms have different meanings in different jurisdictions.21 
When this article refers to de facto parentage, it means de facto parentage 
as defined by the American Law Institute (ALI), unless otherwise explained.22 
This definition is very similar to the definition of de facto parentage in the stat-
utory jurisdictions that this article focuses on: Delaware and Washington, 
D.C.23 The ALI defines a de facto parent as 
an individual other than a legal parent or a parent by estoppel who, for a signifi-
cant period of time not less than two years, 
(i) lived with the child and, 
(ii) for reasons primarily other than financial compensation, and with the agree-
ment of a legal parent to form a parent-child relationship, or as a result of a 
complete failure or inability of any legal parent to perform caretaking functions, 
(A) regularly performed a majority of the caretaking functions for the child, 
or 
(B) regularly performed a share of caretaking functions at least as great as 
that of the parent with whom the child primarily lived.24 
While I agree with the substantive definition offered by the American Law In-
stitute and use it as the basis for parentage in praxi, I object to its operation. 
Under the ALI definition, de facto parents and parents by estoppel do not have 
the same rights as legal parents.25 Thus, in jurisdictions with de facto parentage 
                                                        
20  See Appleton, supra note 18, at 1486. 
21  Id. at 1486–87. For an overview of state court cases’ treatment of various functional par-
ents, see Robin Fretwell Wilson, Trusting Mothers: A Critique of the American Law Insti-
tute’s Treatment of De Facto Parents, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1103, 1180–89 (2010) (specifi-
cally, Appendix D, which contains a chart). 
22  PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 2.03 (AM. L. INST. 2002). 
23  This article also focuses on California not due to a de facto parentage statute as de facto 
parents in California are not parents but due to recent revisions to the California Code which 
allow a child to have more than two parents, which is the same effect that de facto parentage 
statutes in Washington, D.C. and Delaware allow. 
24  PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 2.03 (AM. L. INST. 2002). 
25  See Appleton, supra note 17, at 272  
More recently, the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: 
Analysis and Recommendations adopted a functional approach by proposing recognition of 
“parents by estoppel” and “de facto parents,” labels that attach based on the acceptance of paren-
tal responsibility, shared residence, and reliance. Although the Principles prescribe that parents 
by estoppel have “all of the privileges of a legal parent,” such parity arises in a limited context – 
the allocation of custodial and decision-making responsibility in the wake of family dissolution. 
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that parallels ALI’s definition, “[s]ome courts have concluded that under the 
common law, de facto parentage does not confer standing to petition for custo-
dy or visitation of a minor child.”26 In such instances, de facto parents are func-
tionally parents but they are not parents under the law. 
B.   “Non-conventional settings”: The Problems that Parentage in Praxi 
Addresses 
Children suffer many disadvantages without parentage in praxi. Economi-
cally, not having access to parentage in praxi negatively impacts the child by 
depriving the child of important benefits, such as “social security or workers 
compensation benefits in the event of the death or disability of the adult” or the 
health insurance benefits that certain employers only offer to their employees’ 
legal children.27 Children whose putative parents are not recognized as legal 
parents may lose access to care, as a person may not be entitled to family leave 
to care for children for whom they are not legally recognized as parents.28 Fur-
ther, “[a]ccess to . . . tax deductions and potentially even citizenship can also 
hinge on these legal relationships [between a parent and child].”29 More central-
ly, as noted above, without the recognition of their putative parents as legal 
parents, children lose access to “visitation should the couple separate, and, most 
important, the right of a surviving parent to have automatic guardianship in 
case of the death or disability of the other.”30 Children who lack recognition of 
their putative parents as legal parents miss out on all of the “rights and protec-
tions . . . guaranteed to children born to married parents, born to one parent and 
adopted by a stepparent, or adopted by married couples.”31 
The following four scenarios offer insight into how parentage in praxi 
would operate, in comparison to other doctrines. 
                                                                                                                                 
De facto parents have an even more explicitly “second-class status,” while still acquiring some 
rights to seek custody and visitation. In the allocation of responsibility for children, the Princi-
ples explicitly accord priority to legal parents and parents by estoppel. For “de facto parentage” 
to arise, the legal parent must have consented to another’s acting as a primary parent or must 
have completely failed to perform a caregiving role. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
26  See Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 932 (Del. 2011) (citing Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808 
(Utah 2007); Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73 (Md. 2008)); see also Courtney G. 
Joslin, The Legal Parentage of Children Born to Same-Sex Couples: Developments in the 
Law, 39 FAM. L.Q. 683, 696 (2005). 
27  Courtney G. Joslin, Interstate Recognition of Parentage in a Time of Disharmony: Same-
Sex Parent Families and Beyond, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 563, 590–91 (2009). 
28  Adam Pertman & Jeanne Howard, Emerging Diversity in Family Life: Adoption by Gay 
and Lesbian Parents, in ADOPTION BY LESBIANS AND GAY MEN: A NEW DIMENSION IN 
FAMILY DIVERSITY 20, 23 (David M. Brodzinsky & Adam Pertman eds., 2012). 
29  Ian Lovett, Measure Opens Door to Three Parents, or Four, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/14/us/a-california-bill-would-legalize-third-and-fourth-
parent-adoptions.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [perma.cc/Q3NE-XMYL]. 
30  Pertman & Howard, supra note 28. 
31  Id. 
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Scenario one: An unmarried couple, Woman A and Woman B, decide to 
have a child using the sperm of a friend (Man C) who intends to help raise the 
child as well. Woman A’s egg is inseminated in a lab with Man C’s sperm and 
implanted into Woman B.32 
Under prevailing law, Woman B would be deemed the legal mother of the 
child (as the “biological” mother), even though Woman A is the genetic moth-
er.33 Man C would be the child’s father if the father was named at birth. In cer-
tain jurisdictions, Woman A and Woman B would both be the child’s parents 
from birth, if Woman A and Woman B were married. However, if Woman A 
and Woman B were unmarried, Woman A would have to obtain judicial recog-
nition of parentage if the requirements of de facto parentage were fulfilled.34 
If Woman A and Woman B ended the relationship before Woman A was 
recognized as a legal parent, the child could be deprived of access to Woman 
A, even if the child saw both of Woman A and Woman B as his or her parents 
and called them both variations of “mom.”35 
In a jurisdiction with parentage in praxi, Woman A could petition the court 
for legal parentage in accordance with the parentage in praxi statute.36 Without 
a form of parentage in praxi, it is likely that Woman A could not be a legal par-
ent or if she could that she would have to replace Man C. In a jurisdiction with 
parentage in praxi, all three individuals could be parents. 
Scenario two: Woman C is married to Husband G and has an affair with 
Man M. Daughter V is born.37 
Under prevailing law, Daughter V is the child of the marriage; her parents 
are Woman C and Husband G. With genetic testing, Husband G can rebut the 
marital presumption, which presumes that a husband is the legal father of a 
child born into the marriage—but Man M does not have the right to do so. Man 
M therefore cannot be a parent of the child.  
In a jurisdiction with parentage in praxi, if a relationship has developed be-
tween Daughter V and Man M, then Man M can petition for legal parentage. 
                                                        
32  See, e.g., Treatment Options for Same-Sex Couples, YALE FERTILITY CTR., http://med 
icine.yale.edu/obgyn/yfc/ourservices/fertility/egg_donation/same-sex_couples.aspx [perma.c 
c/PXZ8-W2QV] (last visited Feb. 1, 2016) (“Some same sex female couples choose to have 
both partners involved, one to provide the eggs and the other the uterus.”). 
33  See, e.g., Polikoff, supra note 14, at 208, 215; see also Clare Huntington, Obergefell’s 
Conservatism: Reifying Family Fronts, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 23 (2015) (discussing the legal 
treatment of nonmarital families after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. 
Hodges). 
34  See Polikoff, supra note 14, at 215–25. 
35  See, e.g., E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 889 (Mass. 1999) (“The child calls the 
plaintiff ‘Mommy’ and the defendant ‘Mama.’ He tells people that he has two mothers.”). 
36  Parentage in praxi operates in a manner legally similar to that of de facto parentage. See, 
e.g., J.W.S., Jr. v. E.M.S., Nos. CS11-01557, CS13-01083, 2013 WL 6174814, at *4–6 (Del. 
Fam. Ct. May 29, 2013) (and the corresponding discussion infra). 
37  This fact pattern is based on the 1988 U.S. Supreme Court case, Michael H. v. Gerald D. 
491 U.S. at 114. As will be discussed infra, the limitations of California law in the recogni-
tion of multi-parent families were not corrected until 2013. 
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Scenario three: This scenario comes from a New York Times article:  
In Portland, Ore., Sean Kane adopted his wife’s two children from her first 
marriage. But because they maintained close ties with their biological father, 
who now lives in California, Mr. Kane did not want the court to sever that legal 
relationship. Instead he pursued a third-parent adoption, which was finalized last 
year.38 
Under third-parent adoption, the child can have three parents: the child’s 
two “natural” (presumably biological) parents and the new third parent.39 How-
ever, such an option is not available in all states.  In most states, stepparents can 
only adopt stepchildren if one of the stepchildren’s natural parents’ parental 
rights have been terminated.40 
In a jurisdiction without a third-parent adoption statute that specifically 
permits a child to have more than two parents, parentage in praxi would focus 
on the relationship between the “new third stepparent” and the child. While that 
relationship would depend on a legal parent having allowed the third parent to 
operate “in the shoes” of a parent, it would not depend on the existence of a le-
gal relationship between the child’s legal parent and the child’s putative par-
ent.41  
Scenario four: Two widowers, a man and a woman, marry. The widowed 
wife has children from her first marriage. The husband never formally adopts 
the children; however, he acts as a father to the children (e.g., provides finan-
cial support and offers guidance), but the children do not call their stepfather 
their father. The widowed individuals divorce. 
Should the now recently divorced husband be legally responsible for those 
children? This answer is not as easy to determine. It is possible that in jurisdic-
tion with parentage in praxi, the widowed husband would be considered a par-
ent, even though he occupied the role of a stepparent as opposed to a parent to 
the children; however, as will be explored later, stepparent roles are more diffi-
cult to define. For example, stepparents are often called by different names that 
are not variations on “mom” or “dad,” especially by children whose parents 
remarried later in their childhood. It is possible that the children would not 
deem those stepparents to be their putative parents, despite the parents’ roles. 
Divorce and other family breakups are difficult for children. “When cou-
ples divorce, the biggest victims of the breakup are often the children, who lose 
                                                        
38  Lovett, supra note 29; see also OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.041(2) (West 2003) (address-
ing the “[r]elationship of adopted child to natural and adoptive parents”). 
39  See, e.g., Lovett, supra note 29. 
40  See, e.g., Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepparents as Third Parties in Relation to Their Step-
children, 40 FAM. L.Q. 81, 85–86 (2006). 
41  Parentage in praxi requires that a parent in praxi “stand in the shoes” of a parent. This 
term comes from New Jersey case law on the rights of third parties. See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 
748 A.2d 539, 545 (N.J. 2000); see also V.C. v. M.J.B., 725 A.2d 13, 20 (N.J. Super. App. 
Div. 1999). 
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the daily support and encouragement of a parent they’ve grown to love and 
trust. Non-custodial parents can experience similar feelings of loss, confusion 
and anger over the failure of a relationship.”42 As such, legal provisions are 
needed to preserve the relationships between children and their putative par-
ents. 
C.   Parentage Overview 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “parent” as: 
The lawful father or mother of someone. In ordinary usage, the term denotes 
more than responsibility for conception and birth. The term commonly includes 
(1) either the natural father or the natural mother of a child [although “natural” 
does not equate with genetic or biological as discussed infra], (2) either the 
adoptive father or adoptive mother of a child, (3) a child’s putative blood parent 
who has expressly acknowledged paternity, and (4) an individual or agency 
whose status as guardian has been established by judicial decree.43 
A more thorough definition of “parent” would recognize that being a par-
ent encompasses both rights and responsibilities. One of those responsibilities 
is custody. The term custody has two components: (1) legal custody, which is 
the “right and responsibility to make decisions for a child”; and (2) residential 
or physical custody.44 Additionally, parents are required to “contribute to the 
economic maintenance and education of a child until the age of majority, the 
child’s emancipation before reaching majority, or the child’s completion of 
secondary education. The obligation is enforceable both civilly and criminal-
ly.”45 This “economic maintenance . . . of a child” includes basic expenses (e.g., 
clothing and food) and other provisions, such as health insurance.46 
I.   BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
The best interests of the child standard governs judicial decision-making 
related to parental obligations, such as “custody, visitation, and adoption.”47 
Goldstein et al. note the vagueness of the term “best interests of the child”: 
“Though everyone may agree that children ought not to be ‘neglected’ or 
                                                        
42  Editorial, ‘De Facto Parenthood,’ BALT. SUN (Feb. 26, 2015, 3:33 PM), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/editorial/bs-ed-defacto-parents-20150226-story.html 
[perma.cc/8KLG-MQAA]. 
43  Parent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
44  Frequently Asked Questions: Child Custody/Visitation, N.Y. COURTHELP, 
http://www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/faqs/childcustody.html [https://web.archive.org/web/201 
30514083241/https://www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/faqs/childcustody.html] [perma.cc/9SJL-
EKQK] (last updated Feb. 26, 2013). 
45  Child Support, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
46  See OCSE Fact Sheet, OFF. OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/pro 
grams/css/resource/ocse-fact-sheet [perma.cc/LB33-TLUF] (last visited Feb. 1, 2016). 
47  Tanya Washington, In Windsor’s Wake: Section 2 of DOMA’s Defense of Marriage at the 
Expense of Children, 48 IND. L. REV. 1, 33 (2014). 
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‘abused’ or that their ‘best interests’ should be served, there is little agreement 
about the meaning of these terms.”48 All states and the District of Columbia 
“have statutes requiring that the child’s best interests be considered whenever 
specified types of decisions are made regarding a child’s custody, placement, or 
other critical life issues.”49 The statutes of “[a]pproximately 21 States and the 
District of Columbia list . . . specific factors for courts to consider in making 
determinations regarding the best interests of the child”50 with the most fre-
quently listed statutory factor being “[t]he emotional ties and relationships be-
tween the child and his or her parents, siblings, family and household members, 
or other caregivers.”51 
One factor that is in the best interests of the child is permanency, which 
“provides the stability, security, and family structure necessary for the healthy 
development of a child.”52 By analogy, the concerns that mandate maintaining a 
child’s relationship with their non-custodial (legal) parent in a two-parent con-
text should apply to the maintenance of the relationship between children and 
putative parents. Therefore, without efforts by legal parents to “nurture the rela-
tionship between the non-custodial parent [or putative parent] and the child, a 
child may feel loss and even abandonment.”53 Children have an interest in a 
preserved relationship with their putative parents. Visitation with their parents 
is in the best interests of the child. Frequent contact with a nonresidential parent 
is linked to “better health for older teens and young adults from disrupted fami-
lies.”54 Additionally, “most children want to maintain relationships with both 
parents.”55 Recognition of an individual as a full legal parent provides a legal 
framework for the maintenance of that putative parent-child relationship. With-
out it, a child can be denied access to his or her putative parents, which can be 
detrimental to the child’s well-being and the best interests of the child. The best 
                                                        
48  JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 16 (1979). 
49  CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 16. 
50  Id. at 3. (“Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin.”). 
51  Id. (The following fifteen states and the District of Columbia list this factor: “Connecticut, 
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Da-
kota, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia.”). 
52  Once Born, Twice Orphaned, supra note 15. 
53  D. WAYNE MATTHEWS, N.C. COOP. EXTENSION SERV., LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF DIVORCE 
ON CHILDREN (1998), http://www.ces.ncsu.edu/depts/fcs/pdfs/fcs482.pdf [perma.cc/Q2GY-
LUDR]. 
54  CHRISTINE WINQUIST NORD & NICHOLAS ZILL, WESTAT, INC., NON-CUSTODIAL PARENTS’ 
PARTICIPATION IN THEIR CHILDREN’S LIVES: EVIDENCE FROM THE SURVEY OF INCOME AND 
PROGRAM PARTICIPATION (1996), http://fatherhood.hhs.gov/SIPP/NONCUSP1.HTM 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20130519051404/http://fatherhood.hhs.gov/SIPP/NONCUSP1.
HTM] [perma.cc/4NDB-CP64]. 
55  Christy M. Buchanan & Parissa L. Jahromi, A Psychological Perspective on Shared Cus-
tody Arrangements, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 419, 420 (2008) (internal citations omitted). 
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interests of the child are independent of the relationship between the child’s 
parents (putative and legal) because 
familial bonds need not depend upon the technicality of the biological or legal 
relationship between a child and an adult. Where longtime foster parents, for ex-
ample, return a child’s affection and make him feel wanted, “looked after,” and 
appreciated, crucial bonds usually form between them which cannot be disturbed 
without harm.56 
Thus, the recognition of parentage gives legal protections to the putative par-
ent-child relationship as seen from the eyes of the child. 
Parentage in praxi furthers the best interests of the child by preserving the 
child’s financial support (or ensuring its imposition when an individual has 
been acting as a parent) and preserving familial ties from the perspective of the 
child. For example, various studies have noted the disadvantage of single-
parent households. As one scholar notes, citing research on the impacts of sin-
gle parents on families, “about half of the disadvantage children of single par-
ents experience is due to economic factors: single-parent homes have less mon-
ey than two-parent homes.”57 Of course, the requirement to pay child support 
attempts to make up for this loss of economic resources by ensuring that the 
child has access to two income sources. By this measure, having three parents 
could be better than having two parents because a child would have a third 
source of income.  
As will be detailed in the section discussing California’s recent statute al-
lowing for more than two parents, when a child under such a statutory regime 
has three parents, these parents share in the support of the child. In California, 
when more than two legal parents exist, “[t]he court sets the amount of child 
support based on both [meaning “each”] party’s income and the percentage of 
time the child is in each parties’ care. The court may also order additional child 
support such as medical support, daycare expense, and other add-ons.”58 Even 
though a child would presumably spend less time with a third noncustodial par-
ent not living in the same household, a child would have access to more support 
sources. 
II.   COMPARING PARENTAGE IN PRAXI TO OTHER DOCTRINES THAT RECOGNIZE 
PUTATIVE PARENTS 
Parentage in praxi is a doctrine that recognizes putative parents as legal 
parents, drawing upon existing legal methods of recognizing individuals who 
                                                        
56  GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 48, at 40. 
57  Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 
649, 684 (2008). 
58  See CAL. DEP’T OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVS., CHILD SUPPORT HANDBOOK 10 (2012), 
http://www.childsup.ca.gov/Portals/0/resources/docs/pub160_english.pdf [perma.cc/UE3P-T 
CGV]. While the Child Support Handbook mentions “both party’s” income, the statute pro-
vides that the number of parties can be greater than two, so “both” should mean “each.” See 
id. 
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act as parents. The theory incorporates aspects of these other methods that have 
effectively recognized some of the parental rights of third parties into one theo-
retical doctrine that can be used for the many types of nontraditional families 
that are becoming more common. Parentage in praxi offers a more comprehen-
sive approach, where other doctrines for recognizing putative parents, as ex-
plored below, only offer some of the benefits of parentage (e.g., visitation). 
A.   De Facto Parentage—Statutory and Doctrinal 
Parentage in praxi would recognize de facto parents as full legal parents in 
the same way that the law recognizes a “natural” mother or father. In order to 
be a de facto parent or a parent in praxi and thus gain the same rights and re-
sponsibilities as natural parents, one must fulfill certain criteria. The application 
of the parentage in praxi “test” would be very similar to that imposed for de 
facto parentage. 
Consent is generally a requirement of de facto parentage, and certain state 
courts have emphasized both the importance of consent requirements and the 
inability of a third parent to “swoop in” and become a parent without a legal 
parent’s consent.59 Consent protects the “fundamental right” of parents from the 
unwanted intrusion of third parties into decisions on how to parent their chil-
dren.60 The status of a parent in praxi can only be obtained with the consent of 
one of the original parents. Presumably, it would be difficult, in the case of a 
child with two original parents, to have both original parents consent to a third 
individual in the “shoes” of a parent. Consent is a key concept when analyzing 
whether a parent in praxi could infringe on an existing legal parent’s rights. An 
original parent who allows another individual to “stand in the place” of a legal 
parent consents to any perceived “loss” of their fundamental rights. Those indi-
viduals whose actions fail to stand in the place of the natural parent are allowed 
to pursue visitation and not the decision-making authority that a legal parent 
would have.61 Because one must stand in the place of the natural parent, merely 
                                                        
59  See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 2.03 (AM. L. INST. 2002); see also In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546 (Colo. App. 2004). See, 
e.g., E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999) (“The de facto parent resides with 
the child and, with the consent and encouragement of the legal parent, performs a share of 
caretaking functions at least as great as the legal parent.”). 
60  See Appleton, supra note 18, at 1488 n.220 (“the [U.S. Supreme] Court has ‘recognized 
the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control 
of their children.’ ” (quoting the plurality opinion in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 
(2000))). 
61  See Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Ky. 2010)  
It has been held that parenting the child alongside the natural parent does not meet the de facto 
custodian standard in KRS 403.270(1)(a). Rather, the nonparent must “literally stand in the place 
of the natural parent.” Id. Although Mullins was providing care and financial support for Zacha-
ry, it was undisputed that Mullins did not have de facto custody status regarding Zachary be-
cause she was co-parenting the child with Picklesimer. Picklesimer maintains that once the court 
determined Mullins was not a de facto custodian, Mullins no longer had standing to pursue cus-
tody on any other grounds. We disagree.  
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parenting alongside a legal parent or “helping out” is insufficient for the estab-
lishment of de facto parent status.62 
Additionally, de facto parents and parents in praxi must undertake their 
role “for reasons primarily other than financial compensation,” which removes 
paid caretakers such as babysitters and nannies from the category of individuals 
eligible to become de facto parents.63 Intent, while not specifically mentioned 
in the ALI definition of de facto parentage, does appear in judicial analysis of 
de facto parentage. Another factor that courts often consider is whether the par-
ent seeking de facto status was “part of the decision to create a family by bring-
ing the child into the world.”64 
Caretaking functions over a specified amount of time are the underpinning 
of de facto parentage. Caretaking functions, however, are easier to define when 
younger children are involved. For example, under the ALI definition of de fac-
to parentage, “caretaking functions” include the following non-exhaustive list: 
“grooming, washing, dressing, toilet training, playing with child, bedtime and 
wake-up, satisfying nutrition needs, protecting child’s safety, providing trans-
portation, directing development, discipline, arranging for education, helping to 
develop relations, arranging for health care, providing moral guidance, and ar-
ranging alternate care for the child.”65 Furthermore, these are all actions that 
extended family, or even a friend who would be “helping out,” would under-
take—although the proportion of time that extended family or friends expend 
for these tasks would likely vary. The ease of an individual undertaking such 
caretaking functions thus operates in conjunction with the requirement that a de 
facto parent (or parent in praxis) stand in the shoes of a parent financially and 
emotionally. 
This article advocates for a parentage form different from de facto parent-
age. This is in part because “the [ALI] Principles do not impose a duty of child 
support on de facto parents, even as the Principles confer rights on former live-
in partners who meet its three-pronged test for de facto parenthood.”66 As legal 
parents are required to support their children financially, those who are granted 
parentage in praxi status must, as a condition of meeting that standard, have 
                                                                                                                                 
Id. (citations omitted). 
62  Id. 
63  See, e.g., E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 891 n.6 (“The de facto parent fulfils [sic] this role ‘for 
reasons primarily other than financial compensation.’ See ALI Principles of the Law of Fam-
ily Dissolution § 2.03(1)(b) (Tent. Draft No. 3 Part I 1998) (adopted at annual meeting May, 
1998). Thus, we do not recognize as a de facto parent a babysitter or other paid caretaker. 
Even though these caretakers may grow to feel genuine affection for their charges, their 
caretaking arrangements arose for financial reasons.”). 
64  Id. (citing to C.M. v. P.R., 649 N.E.2d 154 (1995)). 
65  See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Trusting Mothers: A Critique of the American Law Institute’s 
Treatment of De Facto Parents, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1103, 1112 (citing to PRINCIPLES OF 
THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, § 2.03(5)(a)–(h), at 
118–19 (AM. L. INST. (2002) (setting forth a non-exclusive list)). 
66  See id. at 1131. 
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provided financial support during the requisite time period before they are 
deemed a legal parent in the same way that another parent would. Thus, some-
one who petitions to become a parent in praxi would be responsible for child 
support just as an “original” parent would be. To borrow the words of a bill 
previously introduced in the Maryland state legislature, a parent in praxi “shall 
have all the duties, rights, and obligations of a parent of the child.”67 
Parentage in praxi can be recognized either doctrinally or statutorily, al-
though statutory recognition is preferable. Some states, including “Maine, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania and Washington have court rulings in which someone 
with no biological or adoptive relationship to a child can still be a full legal 
parent if a judge finds that the adult has functioned as a parent and has contrib-
uted substantially to the child’s life.”68 For example, in 2004, the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court of Maine stated that it had “recognized de facto parental rights or 
similar concepts in addressing rights of third parties who have played an unu-
sual and significant parent-like role in a child’s life in several opinions over the 
last sixty years.”69 However, in that same decision, the Court declined to ex-
pressly define the standard for determining de facto parenthood, demonstrating 
the uncertainty that comes with reliance on judicial decisions rather than stat-
utes.70 This 2004 Maine opinion left open the possibility that the ultimate defi-
nition of what legally makes a parent would be “fleshed out by the Legislature 
. . . in the future.”71 But, in the meantime, individuals in the jurisdiction would 
be unable to predictably plan how to translate being a putative parent into being 
a legal parent.72 Similarly, Washington D.C., which has statutory de facto par-
entage provisions that are discussed infra, had no standard definition for what 
de facto parentage was prior to 2007.73 The unpredictability of doctrinal de fac-
to parentage—the source of which may come from equity or a judge’s interpre-
tation of the best interests of the child standard—in addition to the uncertainty 
                                                        
67  See H.B. 577, 432nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2015) http://mgaleg.mary 
land.gov/2015RS/bills/hb/hb0577f.pdf [perma.cc/RD2F-PJH4] (last visited March 4, 2015). 
68  See MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., ALL CHILDREN MATTER: HOW LEGAL AND 
SOCIAL INEQUALITIES HURT LGBT FAMILIES 47, (2011) http://www.lgbtmap.org/file/all-
children-matter-full-report.pdf [perma.cc/U4AZ-CW2H] (internal citation omitted). 
69  C.E.W. v. D.E.W, 845 A.2d 1146, 1149 (Me. 2004). 
70  Id. at 1152. 
71  Id. 
72  Id. 
73  See Fields v. Mayo, 982 A.2d 809, 813 n.4 (D.C. 2009)  
A few of our pre-2007 cases use the term ‘de facto parent(s)’ but without explication of the con-
cept. See Simms v. United States, 867 A.2d 200, 206 (D.C. 2005); In re P.S., 797 A.2d 1219, 
1224 (D.C. 2001); In re L.W., 613 A.2d 350, 354 (D.C. 1992). The term has been used and ex-
plained in other jurisdictions. See Philbrook v. Theriault, 957 A.2d 74, 78–80 (Me. 2008) 
(grandparents failed to establish that they were de facto parents); In re Parentage of L.B., 155 
Wash. 2d 679, 122 P.3d 161, 165 (2005) (case remanded to determine whether a female partner 
enjoyed the status of de facto parent); Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 774 N.E.2d 1052, 1061 n. 
15 (2002) (defining de facto parent). 
Id. 
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that may result from allowing individual judges to interpret fairness, is that in 
some states, equity is not available.74 In other words, in certain jurisdictions 
such as California, Florida, and New York, the legislature has specifically lim-
ited the equitable discretion of judges in family law matters.75 
Because statutes offer the benefits of predictability and uniformity, parent-
age in praxi should preferably be incorporated statutorily as opposed to doctri-
nally. The de facto parent statutes discussed in this section are also the founda-
tion for parentage in praxi. Both Washington, D.C. and Delaware provide 
statutory tests for de facto parentage. The California statute discussed in this 
section amended the California code to specifically allow for more than two 
parents in custody and child support determinations. Parentage in praxi would 
combine these two types of statutes in order to make clear that (1) a putative 
parent currently not recognized by the law can become a legal parent and (2) a 
child can have more than two parents. Other states have statutes allowing puta-
tive parents to seek custody of children, but those statutes do not specifically 
outline what test is involved.76 Parentage in praxi provides that clarity. 
1.   Delaware 
Delaware statutorily provides for de facto parentage under 13 Del. C. § 8-
201 (“Establishment of parent child relationship”), which provides: 
(c) De facto parent status is established if the Family Court determines that the 
de facto parent: 
(1) Has had the support and consent of the child’s parent or parents who 
fostered the formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship be-
tween the child and the de facto parent; 
(2) Has exercised parental responsibility for the child . . . 
                                                        
74  See E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 893 n.11 (Mass. 1999)  
Jurisdictions that have reached the opposite result [on de facto parentage] differ from ours be-
cause their statutory law supplants the equitable powers of their courts. See, e.g., West v. Supe-
rior Court, 59 Cal. App. 4th 302, 309, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 160 (1997) (court lacked jurisdiction to 
enter order granting visitation rights to former partner because statutory law occupies field of 
child visitation); Music v. Rachford, 654 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (per curiam) 
(visitation rights with regard to nonparent solely statutory); Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 
651, 656, 569 N.Y.S.2d 586, 572 N.E.2d 27 (1991) (same-sex partner not parent within meaning 
of domestic relations statute). But see Lynda A.H. v. Diane T.O., 243 A.D. 2d 24, 27, 673 
N.Y.S.2d 989 (1998) (same-sex partner denied visitation because it impermissibly impaired bio-
logical mother’s right to custody and control of child). 
Id. 
75  Id. 
76  See Courtney G. Joslin, supra note 14 (Those states are Washington, D.C., “Hawaii, Indi-
ana, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon, and Texas . . . .That is, in these states, people who have 
functioned as a parent to a child are statutorily entitled to seek custody even though they are 
not the legal parents of the child.”) (citations omitted). 
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(3) Has acted in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have estab-
lished a bonded and dependent relationship with the child that is parental in 
nature.77 
The Delaware de facto parentage statute expands the category of individuals 
entitled to be legal parents and therefore expands the category of individuals 
entitled to petition for custody of a child.78 
In an unpublished opinion, a Delaware family court adjudicated a situation 
very similar to that of Michael H. v. Gerald D. (the basis for Scenario 2 in this 
article).79 In Michael H. v. Gerald D., the child of the marriage, Victoria D., 
was biologically and genetically related to her mother, Carole D., but she was 
not genetically related to her father, Gerald D.80 While Gerald D. was “listed as 
[her] father on her birth certificate and always held Victoria out to the world as 
his daughter,” Victoria D.’s biologically father was actually Michael H.81 As 
she grew older, Victoria D. “found herself within a variety of quasi-family 
units”; these family units always included Carole D., but the existence of Mi-
chael H. and Gerald D. within these units varied as Carole D. traveled and lived 
with other men, including Michael H. (who held Victoria out as his own once 
he discovered that Victoria was his daughter), Gerald D., and another man, 
Scott K.82  Justice Scalia “hoped” in 1989 that these facts were “extraordinary” 
before holding that Michael H. did not have a right to rebut the marital pre-
sumption (of Gerald D.’s parentage).83  
In contrast, a Delaware family court case addressing a similar situation in 
2013 found that a child in a similar situation, a child called “M.,” should have 
three parents instead of two.84 In J.W.S., Jr. v. E.M.S., J.W.S. (who married 
E.M.S. after E.M.S. became pregnant) was the presumed father of a child 
whom he had considered his own since the child’s birth, even though J.W.S. 
was not listed on the child’s birth certificate. The child, M., had relationships 
with both J.W.S. and the genetic father, who was referred to in the opinion as 
D.85 M. called each of the men “Dad.”86 After D. rebutted the presumption that 
J.W.S. was the child’s father, J.W.S. was still eligible to be a de facto parent 
under Delaware law. In fact, the court found that J.W.S. met the requirements 
to be such a parent.87 The court explained that “it is appropriate to give legal 
                                                        
77   13 DEL. C. § 8-201(c) (2013); see also MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra 
note 68 at 41–2. 
78  See Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 928 (Del. 2011). 
79  See generally J.W.S., Jr. v. E.M.S., Nos. CS11-01557, CS13-01083, 2013 WL 6174814 
(Del. Fam. Ct. May 29, 2013). 
80  491 U.S. 110, 114 (1989). 
81  Id. at 113–14. 
82  Id. at 114. 
83  Id. at 113, 131–32. 
84  See J.W.S., Jr., 2013 WL 6174814, at *1. 
85  Id. at *1, *3. 
86  Id. at *3. 
87  Id. at *4–5. 
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parental status to three people in this case: [E.M.S.] as the biological mother, D. 
as the adjudicated biological father, and [J.W.S.] as a de facto parent.”88 This 
was not the first time that a Delaware family court judge established a family 
with three legal parents; it had done so as early as 2012.89 
2.   Washington, D.C. 
Washington, D.C. also statutorily provides for de facto parentage as of 
2007.90 In Washington, D.C.: 
(1) “De facto parent” means an individual: 
(A) Who: 
(i) Lived with the child in the same household at the time of the 
child’s birth or adoption by the child’s parent; 
(ii) Has taken on full and permanent responsibilities as the child’s 
parent; and 
(iii) Has held himself or herself out as the child’s parent with the 
agreement of the child’s parent or, if there are 2 parents, both par-
ents; or 
(B) Who: 
(i) Has lived with the child in the same household for at least 10 of 
the 12 months immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or 
motion for custody; 
(ii) Has formed a strong emotional bond with the child with the en-
couragement and intent of the child’s parent that a parent-child rela-
tionship form between the child and the third party; 
(iii) Has taken on full and permanent responsibilities as the child’s 
parent; and 
(iv) Has held himself or herself out as the child’s parent with the 
agreement of the child’s parent, or if there are 2 parents, both par-
ents.91 
Parentage in praxi would adopt the Washington, D.C. requirement that consent 
be obtained from both parents (if the child did indeed have two legally recog-
nized parents). This deference to the original parents would allay some critics’ 
concerns about other individuals “swooping in” to infringe upon parental 
rights—although it could very well make parentage in praxi more contentious. 
It is easy to envision a scorned former spouse (and original parent) objecting to 
the addition of his or her previous spouse’s new partner, who has “taken” his or 
                                                        
88  Id. at *5. 
89  See A.L. v. D.L., Nos. CK12-01390, CK 08-01673, 2012 WL 6765564, at *3 (Del. Fam. 
Ct. Sept. 19, 2012) (“Finding that Father is J’s de facto parent puts this family in the unique 
situation of a child having three legal parents.”). 
90  See D.C. CODE § 16-831.01 (2013); see also Fields v. Mayo, 982 A.2d 809, 813 (D.C. 
2009) (“Under D.C. Law 17-21, the District of Columbia Safe and Stable Homes for Chil-
dren Act of 2007, which became effective on September 20, 2007, after the trial court issued 
its March 2, 2006 findings and conclusions in this case, the District’s legislature provided 
that a de facto parent “shall be deemed a parent” for the purpose of determining the legal and 
physical custody of a child.”). 
91  D.C. CODE § 16-831.01(1). 
16 NEV. L.J. 743, LEWIS - FINAL.DOCX 4/12/16  6:32 PM 
Spring 2016] BIOLOGY, GENETICS, NURTURE 761 
her place as a legal parent. Still, it may be in the best interests of the child to 
have another individual to serve as a “check” on the imposition of a new parent 
on a child. Judges make decisions based only on the evidence offered to them, 
so it is better that there be multiple perspectives and sources of that evidence. 
If, after petitioning multiple times—and being denied due to another parent’s 
opposition—a putative parent has showed that he or she has completed the re-
quirements of becoming a parent in praxi, then the judge should consider 
whether visitation is available for that individual, without entirely disregarding 
the consent requirement. 
In Washington, D.C., if an individual is classified as a de facto parent, that 
individual can petition for custody of the child under the third party custody 
statute.92 Under this statutory scheme, a de facto parent may be awarded custo-
dy.93 At the same time, the child’s natural parents retain their parental rights 
and responsibilities.94 Therefore, children with statutorily-recognized legal par-
ents are entitled to financial support from all of their parents. This furthers the 
best interests of the child by ensuring children’s financial well-being and con-
tributing to their emotional well-being by preserving parent-child relationships. 
 Some scholars would differentiate between legal parents when assigning 
responsibility. For example, Professor Melanie Jacobs  
propose[s] that the primary parents who engage in the bulk of daily responsibil-
ity for the child—and often have the most benefit from the close contact—
                                                        
92  See D.C. CODE § 16-831.02  
Action for custody of a child by a third party:  
(a)(1) A third party may file a complaint for custody of a child or a motion to intervene in any 
existing action involving custody of the child under any of the following circumstances: 
(A) The parent who is or has been the primary caretaker of the child within the past 3 years 
consents to the complaint or motion for custody by the third party; 
(B) The third party has: 
(i) Lived in the same household as the child for at least 4 of the 6 months immediately 
preceding the filing of the complaint or motion for custody, or, if the child is under 
the age of 6 months, for at least half of the child’s life; and 
(ii) Primarily assumed the duties and obligations for which a parent is legally respon-
sible, including providing the child with food, clothing, shelter, education, financial 
support, and other care to meet the child’s needs; or 
(C) The third party is living with the child and some exceptional circumstance exists such 
that relief under this chapter is necessary to prevent harm to the child; provided, that the 
complaint or motion shall specify in detail why the relief is necessary to prevent harm to 
the child. 
(2) A third party who is employed by the child’s parent to provide child care duties for that child 
may not file, under this chapter, a complaint for custody of that child or intervene in any existing 
action under this chapter involving custody of that child.”). 
Id. 
93  See id.; see also Changes in Custody, CHILD SUPPORT SERV. DIVISION, http://cssd.d 
c.gov/page/changes-custody [perma.cc/32B7-5UU5] (last visited Feb. 1, 2016) (Washington, 
D.C. states that “[t]he third party legal custodian or de facto parent has the legal responsibil-
ity to make decisions regarding the child’s health, education and general welfare.”). 
94  See Changes in Custody, supra note 93. 
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should have greater rights and responsibility regarding the raising of the child 
than a third—or fourth—parent who contributes less, or no, financial support 
and less emotional support and has a more tenuous relationship with the child.95 
A statutory scheme that incorporated parentage in praxi would not create a hi-
erarchy between parents. A child would have custodial and noncustodial par-
ents, but the court would not engage in an effort to determine which of three 
parents should have the most rights and responsibilities; a parent is a parent. 
Similarly, child support guidelines would not differentiate between noncustodi-
al parents in a hierarchical manner. All noncustodial parents would be subject 
to the same child support guidelines. A statutory scheme incorporating parent-
age in praxi would, however, differentiate between a legal parent and an ex-
tended family member or close friend. Thus, if an individual who would be 
identified as a “second or third legal parent” under another scholar’s theory did 
not function in the same manner as a legal parent, then that person would not be 
a parent in praxi and would not be entitled to parental rights and responsibili-
ties. 
3.   California 
 Approximately twenty-four years after Michael H. v. Gerald D., California 
governor Gerald Brown signed into law a bill on October 4, 2013, “allow[ing] 
children in California to have more than two legal parents.”96 In Michael H. v. 
Gerald D., the Supreme Court focused on the American historical practice of 
presuming that the parents of a child born during a marriage were the married 
couple and that an extramarital “natural father” did not have the constitutional 
right to rebut that presumption.97 This decision meant that California was not 
constitutionally required to allow Victoria D. to have two fathers.98 Over two 
decades after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Michael H. v. Gerald D., California 
Senate Bill 274 was proposed in response to a California court case that specif-
ically limited the number of parents a child could have to two.99 The San Fran-
cisco-based author of Senate Bill 274 sought “to address the changes in family 
                                                        
95  See Melanie B. Jacobs, More Parents, More Money: Reflections on the Financial Implica-
tions of Multiple Parentage, 16 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 217, 223 (2010). 
96  See Patrick McGreevy & Melanie Mason, Brown Signs Bill to Allow Children More Than 
Two Legal Parents, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2013, 9: 27 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-
me-brown-bills-parents-20131005,0,7226241.story [perma.cc/7UWD-QJY9]; S.B. 274, 
Chapter 564 (Cal. 2013) (California Senate bill allowing more than two legal parents). 
97  See 491 U.S. 110, 113, 120–26 (1989). 
98  See id. at 130–31 (1989) (“This assertion merits little discussion, for, whatever the merits 
of the guardian ad litem’s belief that such an arrangement can be of great psychological ben-
efit to a child, the claim that a State must recognize multiple fatherhood has no support in the 
history or traditions of this country.”). 
99  See S.B. 274 (“The purpose of this bill is to abrogate In re M.C. (2011) 195 Cal. App. 4th 
197 insofar as it held that where there are more than two people who have a claim to parent-
age under the Uniform Parentage Act, courts are prohibited from recognizing more than two 
of these people as the parents of a child, regardless of the circumstances.”). 
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structure in California, including situations in which same-sex couples have a 
child with an opposite-sex biological parent.”100 The enacted bill operates in 
conjunction with the Uniform Parentage Act:  
This bill does not change any of the requirements for establishing a claim to par-
entage under the Uniform Parentage Act. It only clarifies that where more than 
two people have claims to parentage, the court may, if it would otherwise be det-
rimental to the child, recognize that the child has more than two parents.101 
 Senate Bill No. 274, as enacted, makes several amendments to the existing 
California Family Code. For example, Section 3040 of Family Code was 
amended to provide that 
[i]n cases where a child has more than two parents, the court shall allocate cus-
tody and visitation among the parents based on the best interest of the child, in-
cluding, but not limited to, addressing the child’s need for continuity and stabil-
ity by preserving established patterns of care and emotional bonds. The court 
may order that not all parents share legal or physical custody of the child if the 
court finds that it would not be in the best interest of the child . . . .102 
This California provision makes clear that the best interests of the child include 
maintaining contact with all of the child’s putative parents, even if that child 
has more than two parents. The bill also adds a section to the Family Code to 
instruct courts to, when a child has more than two parents, “divide child sup-
port obligations among the parents . . . based on income and amount of time 
spent with the child by each parent.”103 It also amends Section 4057 of the 
Family Code, which addresses the amount of child support to be ordered for the 
child, to provide for the sharing of support obligations by all parents.104 The 
California statute accomplishes some of the goals of parentage in praxi by re-
moving the limitation that a child may not have more than two parents, but it is 
not a de facto parentage statute (meaning it does not incorporate the ALI defini-
tion) or a parentage in praxi statute. In fact, in California, a de facto parent is 
not a legal parent.105 Nevertheless, this recent California statute showcases how 
a statute could be fashioned to support one of the goals of parentage in praxi: 
removing the ceiling on two parents. 
                                                        
100  McGreevy & Mason, supra note 96. 
101  S.B. 274. 
102  Id. 
103  Id. 
104  Id. 
105  See In re A.F., 173 Cal. Rptr. 3d 774, 780 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2014). 
De facto parents do not have the same substantive rights and preferences as parents or even legal 
guardians. De facto parents have no right to reunification services, visitation, custody, continued 
placement of the child, “or to any degree of independent control over the child’s destiny whatso-
ever.” De facto parent status “merely provides a way for the de facto parent to stay involved in 
the dependency process and provide information to the court.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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B.   Adoption 
De facto parentage, like parentage in praxi, requires one to act as a child’s 
parent for a requisite period of time, whereas adoption presumes one has the 
ability to do so.106 Adoption substitutes parents who show an intention to act as 
parents for a child’s natural parents.107 Adoption is insufficient for achieving 
the goals of parentage in praxi because  
[a]doption is by definition the legal transfer of parenthood from one to another 
parent or couple. This transfer normally operates to completely terminate paren-
tal rights and relations between the parent and child, including relations between 
the child and the terminated parent’s kin, such as the child’s siblings, grandpar-
ents, aunts, uncles, and cousins; in their stead, adoption creates a new set of fam-
ily relationships through the adoptive parent or parents. In addition, because 
formal adoption was created before the rise of divorce, adoption statutes initially 
contemplated termination of the rights of any legal parent and complete transfer 
to an entirely new family.108 
With “classic” adoption, a three-parent family could not exist. Parentage in 
praxi allows for a more holistic view of a child’s life than the limited historical 
viewpoint that restricts a child to two parents.  
C.   In Loco Parentis 
In loco parentis is another doctrine that allows third parties to assert lim-
ited parental rights. The definition of in loco parentis in some states is similar 
to the definition of de facto parentage: 
The term ‘in loco parentis,’ according to its generally accepted common law 
meaning, refers to a person who has put himself in the situation of a lawful par-
ent by assuming the obligations incident to the parental relation without going 
through the formalities necessary to legal adoption. It embodies the two ideas of 
assuming the parental status and discharging the parental duties.109  
“[T]he common law doctrine of in loco parentis [affords] rights to nonparents 
where the exercise of those rights is in the best interests of the child.”110 
The doctrine of in loco parentis has had an important historical role in al-
lowing recognition of parental rights for putative parents who had previously 
                                                        
106  See Am. L. Inst., Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommen-
dations, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1 (2001); see also Jared C. Leuk, The Best Interests 
of the Child in Adoption: An Article Review, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 607, 609 (2000) 
(“Regardless of the adoption method, the prospective parents must petition the court for 
adoption, at which time their fitness for adoption of the child is assessed.”). 
107  See Marjorie Maguire Shultz, supra note 2, at 320. 
108  Annette R. Appell, Legal Issues in Lesbian and Gay Adoption, in ADOPTION BY LESBIANS 
AND GAY MEN: A NEW DIMENSION IN FAMILY DIVERSITY 36, 37 (David Brodzinsky & Adam 
Pertman eds., 2012). 
109  Niewiadomski v. United States, 159 F.2d 683, 686 (6th Cir. 1947); see also Latham v. 
Schwerdtfeger, 802 N.W.2d 66, 72 (Neb. 2011); L.S.K. v. H.A.N., 813 A.2d 872, 876 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2002). 
110  Latham, 802 N.W.2d at 72. 
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parented the child as a part of a same-sex relationship. This is because in loco 
parentis focused on the role of the parent and was not limited by the relation-
ship between the former partners. Because the best interests of the child stand-
ard is “the polestar consideration” in child welfare decisions, this standard fo-
cuses on the relationship between a child and a putative parent rather than the 
relationship between that putative parent and his or her partner or the gender of 
that partner.111 Therefore, in a state like Arkansas, which did not recognize 
same-sex marriage or grant domestic partnership rights prior to 2015, the right 
of a same-sex partner to assert in loco parentis was not diminished by state pol-
icy or law on same-sex relationships.112 
Despite the emphasis on the role of the person in loco parentis as a care-
giver of the child (like a legal parent would be), the application of this doctrine 
still focuses on the best interests of the child rather than the rights of the parent 
to a parent-child relationship.113 As such, many decisions regarding in loco 
parentis do not mention support obligations on the part of the person granted 
visitation rights.114 It is not in the best interests of the child to recognize the 
rights of legal parentage but not the responsibilities of that parentage. Parentage 
in praxi overcomes this shortcoming by only recognizing those putative parents 
who have acted as legal parents by fulfilling these responsibilities. Recognition 
of a parent in praxi—as opposed to as an individual who has stood in loco 
parentis—would result in the enforcement of both the legal rights and respon-
sibilities of parentage. 
D.   Psychological Parentage 
Psychological parentage is another doctrine that recognizes “children have 
a strong interest in maintaining the ties that connect them to adults who love 
and provide for them.”115 The doctrine of psychological parentage allows third 
parties who achieve parent status with the consent of a legal parent to retain 
their status even where a past partner may try to thwart their efforts.116 Psycho-
                                                        
111  Bethany v. Jones, 378 S.W.3d 731, 738 (Ark. 2011). 
112  Id. at 731. Georgia is also a state that had a same-sex marriage ban prior to the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015) (holding 
that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry in the United States). For 
analysis of the impacts of the Georgia same-sex marriage ban on the children of same-sex 
couples, see Tanya Washington, supra note 47, at 14–16. 
113  Bethany, 378 S.W.3d at 738. 
114  See generally id.; In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546 (Colo. App. 2004). 
115  V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 550 (N.J. 2000). 
116  Id. at 554 (“Once a third party has been determined to be a psychological parent to a 
child, under the previously described standards, he or she stands in parity with the legal par-
ent. Ibid. Custody and visitation issues between them are to be determined on a best interests 
standard giving weight to the factors set forth in [New Jersey law].”). 
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logical parentage also has a longstanding role in the application of the best in-
terests of the child standard.117 As one observer has noted,  
[n]early every court granting same-sex couple adoptions privileged the best in-
terests of the child standard and equated these interests with the psychological 
parent principle associated with that standard along with the recognition that it is 
often better for a child to have two legal parents rather than one. Most of the 
cases involved families that had been together for years during which time the 
second parents participated in child rearing, childcare, and financial support of 
the child.118 
The term “psychological parenthood” is used interchangeably with “de fac-
to parenthood” in certain states, such as New Jersey.119 In some states, the test 
for psychological parentage is similar to the definition of de facto parentage of-
fered by the American Law Institute, Delaware, and Washington, D.C.: 
(1) the legal parent consented to and fostered the nonparent’s formation and es-
tablishment of a parent-like relationship between the nonparent and the child; (2) 
the nonparent and the child lived together in the same household; (3) the non-
parent assumed obligations of parenthood by taking significant responsibility for 
the child’s care, education and development, including contributing towards the 
child’s support, without expectation of financial compensation, and (4) the non-
parent has established a parental role sufficient to create with the child a bonded, 
dependent relationship parental in nature.120 
In states without statutes mandating a test for psychological parentage, if the 
doctrinally applied test offers the same benefits as a de facto parent statute 
would, this is a significant step towards ensuring the best interests of the child. 
However, such tests are buried in case law, making statutes providing for de 
facto parentage much easier for the public to access and comply with. Parent-
age in praxi provides a solution by combining the benefits of de facto parentage 
under the ALI definition with the accessibility and predictability of statutory 
law. 
E.   Visitation 
In states that do not recognize those who would be deemed parents in 
praxi, visitation offers a piece of what parenthood entails. Visitation is the 
least-preferred doctrine analyzed in this article because it does not confer deci-
                                                        
117  See, e.g., In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d at 559 (“The importance of a psychological parent to 
the child has long been considered in applying Colorado’s best interests of the child stand-
ard.”). 
118  See Appell, supra note 108, at 47 (citations omitted). 
119  See V.C., 748 A.2d at 545 (although New Jersey prefers the use of the term “psychologi-
cal parent” Id. at 546, n.3: “The terms psychological parent, de facto parent, and functional 
parent are used interchangeably in this opinion to reflect their use in the various cases, stat-
utes, and articles cited. Psychological parent is the preferred term.”). 
120  See, e.g., In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d at 560 (citing to V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 
2000); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000); In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 
N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995) (citing to various out-of-state cases)). 
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sion-making power on putative parents, as parentage in praxi does.121 Addition-
ally, visitation can involve restrictions, such as scheduling requirements, super-
vision, and limited duration.122 
F.   Uniform Parentage Act 
While not a doctrine per se, discussion of the Uniform Parentage Act arises 
in many articles related to the adoption of children conceived through assisted 
reproductive technology and discussions of “nontraditional families.”123 The 
Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) is a model statute “promulgated in 1973 and 
adopted in 19 states.”124 The Act was revised in 2000 and amended in 2002.125 
Some scholars advocate for the usage of the UPA to resolve “disputes between 
lesbian co-parents and their former same-sex partners.”126 However, this article 
does not advocate for the usage of the UPA over parentage in praxi because the 
UPA does not recognize the increasing prevalence of families with greater than 
two parents.127 Although the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act, when defining the 
parent-child relationship, initially states that the parent-child relationship exists 
“between a child and his natural or adoptive parents,” it subsequently implies a 
two-parent framework by stating that the child-parent relationship “includes the 
mother and child relationship and the father and child relationship.”128 Similar-
ly, the 2002 version of the UPA focuses on defining mothers (e.g., “gestational 
mother”) and fathers (e.g., “alleged father,” “acknowledged father”, etc.), thus 
impliedly recognizing only two-parent families.129 Tellingly, California adopted 
the 1973 UPA, but provisions still had to be added to the California Family 
                                                        
121  See, e.g., Court Help: Families & Children, ST. N.Y. CTS. (Apr. 9, 2015), 
https://www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/Family/index.shtml [perma.cc/DFL3-KXP9] (last visit-
ed Nov. 19, 2015). 
122  See id. 
123  See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, Response: And Baby Makes . . . How Many? Using In re 
M.C. to Consider Parentage of a Child Conceived Through Sexual Intercourse and Born to 
a Lesbian Couple, 100 GEO. L.J. 2015, 2027 (2012); see also Laura Nicole Althouse, Three’s 
Company? How American Law Can Recognize a Third Social Parent in Same-Sex Headed 
Families, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 171 (2008); Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One 
Mommy and One Legal Stranger: Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian 
Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 341 (2002). 
124  See Why States Should Adopt UPA, UNIF. L. COMM’N, http://uniformlaws.org/Narra 
tive.aspx?title=Why%20States%20Should%20Adopt%20UPA [perma.cc/UZ6W-NC7R] 
(last visited Feb. 1, 2013) (The statute “was revised in 2000, and amended in 2002.”). 
125  See Acts: Parentage Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Paren 
tage%20Act [perma.cc/VA7R-8EBZ] (last visited Oct. 6, 2013). 
126  See Jacobs, supra note 123, at 344; see also Althouse, supra note 123, at 171. 
127  See Jacobs, supra note 123; see also Althouse, supra note 123, at 171. 
128  See Uniform Parentage Act: § 1 Parent and Child Relationship Defined, UNIF. L. 
COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/parentage/upa73.pdf [perma.cc/78J7-7H 
78] (last visited Oct. 6, 2013). 
129  See Uniform Parentage Act (2002): § 102 Definitions, UNIF. L. COMM’N, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/parentage/upa_final_2002.pdf [perma.cc/5XR9-3R 
GQ] (last visited Feb. 1, 2016). 
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Code in 2013 in order to provide for families with more than two parents.130 
The same needed to be done in Delaware, where the legislature had originally 
adopted the Delaware Uniform Parentage Act from the 1973 UPA.131 
G.   Stepparent Adoption/Third-Parent Adoption 
Scenario three (presented in the Introduction of this article) addresses third-
parent adoption. While third-parent adoption, by its title, would seem to include 
stepparent adoption, the two legal concepts are very different because steppar-
ent adoption generally requires the termination of one of the “natural” parent’s 
parental rights.132 Thus, stepparent adoption limits a child to two parents. Simi-
larly, while stepparent adoption does expand the category of third parties who 
can become parents, it is less favorable than that of parentage in praxi because 
it focuses on the legal relationship between a previously-recognized legal par-
ent and a possible third parent rather than focusing on the parent-child relation-
ship. Scenario three was based on the actions of an individual who pursued 
third-parent adoption in Oregon. Outside of Oregon, some jurisdictions contin-
ue to not recognize stepparents as legal parents when a child already has two 
parents, although the law in those jurisdictions does, at the very least, maintain 
a child’s ability to inherit from their birth parent: 
In a few States, adoption by a stepparent has no effect on a child’s legal right to 
inherit from either birth parent or other family members. In most States, howev-
er, since the child’s legal ties to the noncustodial birth parent are severed by the 
adoption, the child can inherit from the former birthparent only when the former 
parent makes provision for the child in his or her written will.133 
While this is a step towards recognizing the role that stepparents and third par-
ties can occupy an important role in a child’s life, even the operation of law in 
this manner does not preserve all of the legal benefits of the parent-child rela-
tionship.   
Stepparents’ recognition as legal parents becomes a more difficult issue in 
the context of a family breakup, leading to the possibility of a stepparent be-
coming the unwilling legal parent of a soon-to-be former stepchild. Steppar-
ents, while identified by a title that includes the word “parent,” are generally 
not legal parents; many stepchildren already have “original” parents and do not 
                                                        
130  See Acts: Parentage Act (1973), UNIF. L. COMM’N, 
http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act%20%281973%29 [perma.cc/8JSR-
W52J] (last visited Feb 1, 2016); discussion supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the California de 
facto parent statute). 
131  See Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d 1, 12 (Del. 2009); see also Bancroft v. Jameson, 19 A.3d 
730, 731 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2010) (“Likely in response to the decision in Smith v. Gordon, the 
Delaware Legislature quickly amended Delaware’s Uniform Parentage Act on July 06, 2009 
to include a de facto parent provision.”). 
132  See, e.g., Margaret M. Mahoney, supra note 40 at 85.  
133  See Stepparent Adoption, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY (May 2013), 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs/f_step.pdf [perma.cc/FU49-X7A3]. 
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view their stepparents as their legal parents. Those original parents most likely 
already have a system in place for the maintenance and support of their natural 
children. This is especially true for the stepparents of older children. It might be 
more difficult to stand in the shoes of a parent when the child already has two 
parents. Even if one of the original parents consent, the older child might prac-
tically stand in the way of the caregiving and establishment of the parent-child 
relationship by a stepparent. Furthermore, if the stepparent is not providing 
nearly as much financial support as the child’s original parent, that individual is 
not a legal parent. 
 Scenario four addresses what happens when a widowed and remarried 
original parent separates from the child’s stepparent. Deciding whether the 
stepparent would become a parent in praxi is more difficult in such a scenario, 
even if the stepparent and the child’s birth parent were the only two possible 
legal parents that the child could have. If the stepparent has provided some sup-
port, but does not operate in a role that is the same as that of a legal parent (e.g., 
the child asks the stepparent for some advice but still goes to their original par-
ent for advice on most life matters), then that stepparent is not a parent in praxi. 
Many stepchildren are kind to their stepparents, but it would possibly take far 
longer for a stepchild, being both older and having had two legal parents (one 
of whom has died), to feel that a stepparent was that child’s legal parent. If the 
stepparent has not petitioned to become a legal parent at the time of family 
breakup, that parent should not be forced to become the legal parent of a child. 
 A co-parenting agreement would be helpful in the above situation. For ex-
ample, in one of the cases cited throughout this article, 
[t]he plaintiff and the defendant manifested their level of commitment to each 
other, to the child, and to their new family by executing and re-executing the co-
parenting agreement. In the co-parenting agreement, the parties revealed their 
beliefs regarding the child’s best interests, stating their wish that the child con-
tinue his relationship with the plaintiff in the event that the parties’ relationship 
ended.134 
Not only would a co-parenting agreement aid in the structuring of the family, it 
would also aid in determining whether an original parent had consented to the 
parent in praxi’s status. It could also outline the exact roles that the individuals 
would have and offer a starting point for any litigation as opposed to starting in 
a “vacuum” and attempting to ascertain exactly what the putative parent did. 
III.   DISADVANTAGES OF PARENTAGE IN PRAXI 
Parentage in praxi has some drawbacks, very similar to de facto parentage. 
For example, de facto parentage is not available from birth because recognition 
of de facto parentage generally requires “a length of time sufficient to have es-
tablished a bonded and dependent relationship with the child that is parental in 
                                                        
134  E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 892 (Mass. 1999) (citing Wilcox v. Trautz, 427 
Mass. 326, 334 n. 7 (1998)). 
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nature.”135 Thus, if there were indeed three individuals from the child’s birth 
who intended to parent the child as legal parents would, another method for 
recognizing parentage might be more useful.136  
Further, recognition of de facto parentage or parentage in praxi requires ju-
dicial action.137 This adjudicatory requirement may serve as a hindrance to the 
operation of normal family life in a situation such as a medical emergency.138 
While one may have decision-making power within the confines of the family, 
that decision-making power may not be recognized in situations where legal 
parentage is necessary, such as when a parent needs to sign a consent form for a 
medical procedure and there is no time to acquire a parentage decision from a 
judge.139 Families should avail themselves of the rights granted by the doctrine 
of parentage in praxi before a relationship disintegrates or an emergency arises. 
Otherwise, the advantages it provides may not be available at the very instant 
they are needed. To make this possible, the regulation of families should be 
easily comprehensible to the public, making statutes providing for parentage in 
praxi more preferable than doctrinal de facto parentage. Not only are statutes 
more publicly accessible, but case law may be harder for those without a legal 
background to understand. 
Being a parent means that an individual would have custody of a child. It is 
most likely that in situations in which a child had three parents, two of those 
parents would live together. So, while a criticism of parentage in praxi, like 
other forms of recognizing multiple parents, is that too many people could be 
involved in the child’s life, there is a practical limit on the number of putative 
parents involved is not boundless. A related criticism of recognizing more than 
two legal parents is that “[b]ecause legal parents have the right to direct the up-
bringing of their child, including decisions regarding with whom their child as-
sociates, the more adults with full parental rights, the greater the possibility of 
family strife.”140 While a child with more parents may receive more economic 
support, more people are involved in the decision-making related to that 
                                                        
135  See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c)(3) (2009). 
136  See, e.g., Melanie Jacobs, Applying Intent-Based Parentage Principles to Nonlegal Les-
bian Coparents, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 433, 440–41 (2005) (noting that “intention has been 
employed when courts are confronted with determining legal parentage soon after the birth 
of a child and before a party has invested significant time functioning as a parent. . . . By 
contrast, functional parenthood doctrine serves as a means of establishing legal parentage 
after someone has already assumed the responsibilities of parenthood and wishes to legalize 
the parent child relationship. Initial intent to parent often leads to functional parenthood but 
there may be instances in which someone meets the criteria of a functional parent but did not 
intend to ‘bring about the birth of the child.’ ”). 
137  See MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 68, at 42. 
138  Id. at 87. 
139  Id. 
140  See Appleton, supra, note 17, at 275. 
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child.141 Similarly, custody is both legal (involving decision-making) and resi-
dential or physical, but limits are placed on the amount of residential or physi-
cal custody that “noncustodial” parents have.142 Thus, while coordinating 
schedules and ensuring that multiple people are able to see a child can be diffi-
cult (especially if those individuals live in different households), the best inter-
ests of the child standard operates so as to prevent visitation from operating to 
the detriment of the child’s well-being. For example, even if a child had three 
parents who lived in three different homes, it is unlikely that a family court 
judge would decide that “splitting” a child’s time equally amongst three homes 
was in the best interests of the child. Similarly, while some scholars would op-
pose the availability of a doctrine like parentage in praxi because it creates a 
“greater possibility of family strife” it is quite possible that in a situation where 
parentage in praxi would apply, there had already been family strife. Such strife 
or the possibility of it should not prevent a child from maintaining contact with 
his or her putative parent. For the child, all of these individuals compose the 
family, and the child needs to maintain his or her relationships within that fami-
ly. 
 It is also worth noting that parentage in praxi would not resolve the issue 
that was the basis for Scenario two—which was the situation present in Mi-
chael H. v. Gerald D.—where the father of a child who was the product of an 
extramarital affair unsuccessfully petitioned for parental rights.143 Reading the 
factual overview provided by Justice Scalia, it appears that Michael H., the 
child’s genetic father, was only in the shoes of a parent for three months in 
1982 and eight months from 1983 to 1984, thus falling short of the two years 
required to establish de facto parentage and parentage in praxi. As an additional 
note, the consent requirement of de facto parentage and parentage in praxi may 
influence one’s ability to comply with the duration requirement; if the original 
parent does not consent to a putative parent becoming a legal parent, then it 
will be difficult for that putative parent to stand in the shoes of a parent for the 
requisite amount of time. 
IV.   THE NEXT FRONTIER: SCIENTIFIC POSSIBILITY OF CHILDREN WITH THREE 
GENETIC PARENTS 
The analysis in this article may apply in the near future to children of 
same-sex couples who are biologically related to all of their putative parents, 
even if there are more than two of them. Scientists at Newcastle University in 
the United Kingdom have refined a laboratory procedure called mitochondrial 
                                                        
141  See, e.g., Custody, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“legal custody (18c) 1. 
CUSTODY (2). 2. CUSTODY (3). 3. The authority to make significant decisions on a child’s 
behalf, including decisions about education, religious training, and healthcare.”). 
142  See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions: Child Custody/Visitation, N.Y. COURTHELP, 
http://nycourts.gov/courthelp//Family/custody.shtml [perma.cc/B9ZA-2AKJ] (last visited 
Feb. 1, 2016). 
143  See 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
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transfer, which would result in the creation of children with three genetic par-
ents.144 The United States Food and Drug Administration is considering wheth-
er to approve further research on the technique involving human experimenta-
tion.145 The procedure is partially aimed at preventing genetic diseases. During 
the mitochondrial transfer, scientists use a portion of DNA from a healthy fe-
male donor instead of the portion of the intended mother’s DNA (specifically, 
the mitochondria). Defective mitochondria are responsible for “genetic disor-
ders such as muscular dystrophy and heart and liver conditions.”146After the 
donor’s mitochondria are used to replace the mitochondria of the biological 
mother (the mother who would provide the largest percentage of female DNA), 
the resultant healthy embryo would be used in the typical in vitro fertilization 
treatment process.147 These resultant embryos contain the DNA of three indi-
viduals.148 The mitochondrial transfer procedure is so new that it has never 
been tested in a full-term birth.149 
Before February 2015, the embryos created through mitochondrial transfer 
could not legally be used in the United Kingdom in human in vitro fertilization. 
After a public consultation, the United Kingdom’s Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority “concluded there was ‘general support’ for the idea and 
that there was no evidence that the advanced form of IVF was unsafe.”150 The 
United Kingdom’s Department of Health produced draft regulations, and the 
House of Lords approved an amendment to the Human Fertilisation & Embry-
ology Act.151 
The procedure has prompted similar skepticism in the United States, where 
the United States Food and Drug Administration spent one-and-a-half days dis-
cussing “oocyte modification in assisted reproduction for the prevention of 
transmission of mitochondrial disease or treatment of infertility.”152 Though the 
process has not yet been approved for human testing, such a technological ad-
                                                        
144  See Ian Sample, Three-person IVF: UK Government Backs Mitochondrial Transfer, 
GUARDIAN, (June 28, 2013, 3:54) http://www.theguardian.com/science/2013/jun/28/uk-
government-ivf-dna-three-people [perma.cc/6TU8-VM55]. 
145  See Cellular, Tissue, and Gene Therapies Advisory Committee Meeting: Announcement, 
U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 25–26, 2014), http://www.fda.gov/advisorycommittee 
s/committeesmeetingmaterials/bloodvaccinesandotherbiologics/cellulartissueandgenetherapi
esadvisorycommittee/ucm380047.htm [perma.cc/FR2L-BE99] [hereinafter Cellular]. 
146  See Sample, supra note 144. 
147  See Press Release, HFEA Launches Public Consultation, Medical Frontiers: Debating 
Mitochondria Replacement, HUMAN FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTHORITY (Sept. 17, 
2012), http://www.hfea.gov.uk/7517.html [perma.cc/6XA7-YPDW]. 
148  Id. 
149  See id.; Sample, supra note 144. 
150  See James Gallagher, UK Government Backs Three-Person IVF, BBC NEWS (June 28, 
2013), www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-23079276 [perma.cc/DJK5-B43L]. 
151  See Brittany Shoot, 3-Parent IVF: Why Isn’t It Available in the United States?, 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 27, 2015, 10:22 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-busine 
ss/2015/feb/27/3-parent-ivf-us-mitochondria-dna-babies [perma.cc/C589-8JBF]. 
152  See Cellular, supra note 145. 
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vance will compel family law to further alter its conception of parentage. The 
doctrine of parentage in praxi, or the statutory recognition of three or more pu-
tative parents, anticipates the potential challenges that could arise if three par-
ent in vitro fertilization is ever used for non-therapeutic purposes. 
CONCLUSION 
Family structures with stepparents, same-sex relationships (and marriage), 
friends (who might be genetically related to the child), and other putative par-
ents who are not just “helping out” are becoming increasingly common. The 
individuals who fulfill all of the roles of traditional parentage should be recog-
nized as parents by the law, even if this results in children having more than 
two parents. Recognizing new forms of parentage such as parentage in praxi 
affords both putative parents and their children legal protection of their rela-
tionships.  
This article makes three major conclusions. First, the law should recognize 
those individuals who meet the statutory requirements of parentage when it is 
in the best interests of the child. Second, if statutory guidelines for the identifi-
cation of parents in praxi do not exist, then a state should develop them, follow-
ing the examples of Washington, D.C., and Delaware. At minimum, a state 
could provide a statutory basis for a child to have more than two parents (as in 
California). Third, using parentage in praxi (or a statute that protects children’s 
relationships with all of their putative parents) to recognize putative parents as 
legal parents furthers a child’s best interests by (1) creating limitations on deci-
sions related to the child and (2) creating legal mechanisms for ensuring stabil-
ity, permanency, financial commitment, etc. within families. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
